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ABSTRACT 
The author compares the UHF Follow-on and MILSTAR 
satellite communication systems. The comparison uses an 
analytical hierarchy process. Although the two systems have 
been tasked with different missions, a comparison of cost, 
capability, and orbit is conducted. UFO provides many of the 
same capabilities as MILSTAR, but on a smaller scale. Since 
UFO is also a new space system acquisition, it is used to 
compare dollars spent to field a viable communication system. 
A review of frequency bands, losses, and problems is conducted 
to establish the similarity of the systems. The available 
classical orbits are investigated to further establish the 
relationship. Cost data is provided to establish the major 
difference in the systems. While MILSTAR does possess more 
total capability than UFO, it is 10 times more costly. 
Additionally, UFO is a satellite that will evolve with new 
technology while MILSTAR is built to full capability 
immediately. In the author's opinion, the incremental 
performance of MILSTAR does not justify its incremental cost. 
iii 
13 Jufdtlfioat10 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Pase 
I .  I N T R O D U C T I O N  ...............:.....................l 
.A.  G E N E R A L  ..............................'.......l 
B .  BACKGROUND ................................... 1 
C.  METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2  
D.  S C O P E  AND L I M I T A T I O N S  ....................... 2 
E .  O R G A N I Z A T I O N  O F  T H E S I S  ....................... 3 
11. U F O  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4  
A .  . BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4  
B. S Y S T E M ' R E Q U I R E M E N T S  .......... ' ...... ' .......... 6 
C.  S A T E L L I T E  ................................... 7 
D .  S P A C E C R A F T  BUS MODULE ....................... 9 
E .  PAYLOAD MODULE AND C O N F I G U R A T I O N  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11 
F. . GROUND CONTROL/TERMINALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 3  
III. MILSTAR .........'.................................. i 5  
A , .  BACKGROUND ..................................15 
B. SYSTEM R E Q U I R E M E N T S  .......................... 1 7  
C.  S A T E L L I T E  ................................... 18 
. ,  . . . .  D .  . . .  .: ;S .PAkECRAFT BUS MODULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 2 0  
,,. .. . . . . . . . .  ..,v. 
.I,,; :'. . . .  ,; : ' , I ,  , 7 1 ,  
. 
I I ,  
1' . 
t .  . . . .  
E.,?. : , - P A Y L O A D  MODULE A N D  CONFIGURATION.. .......... . 2 0  
, . .  ....... ' . ., : 'i , ,  
. . . .  :'. . F .' ; , 'GROUND CONTROL/TERMINALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .2  1 
. . . . .  ............. I 
i v  
c 
i 
IV . FREQUENCY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23 
A . BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23 
B . EHF .......................................... 25 
1 . Rainfall Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26 
2 . Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28 
3 . Spread Spectrum ........................ 32 
C . UHF AND SHF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35 
V . ORBITS ............................................ 38 
A . BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38 
B . GEOSYNCHRONOUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40 
C . TWENTY-FOUR HOUR MOLNIYA .................... 41 
D . TWELVE-HOUR MOLNIYA ......................... 44 
E . GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM ( G P S )  .............. 4 6  
F . LOW EARTH ORBITS ............................ 48 
G . DOPPLER/ANGULAR VELOCITY AND ACCELERATION . . . .  49 
H . ORBITAL ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50 
VI . SATELLITE SYSTEM COMPARISON ....................... 52 
A . BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52  
B . SCENARIO DRIVEN COMPARISONS .................. 54 
1 . Persian Gulf (Hypothetical Scenario 1) .. 55 
2 . The North Pole (Hypothetical 
Scenario 2) ........................ 57 
3 . Mediterranean/European Theatre 
(Hypothetical Scenario 3 )  .......... 58 
V 
V I I  . CONCLUSIONS/FOLLOW-ON STUDY ....................... 60 
A . CONCLUSIONS .................................. 60 
B: FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 1  
LIST O F  REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63 
I N I T I A L  D I S T R I B U T I O N  LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65 
v i  
c 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
A. GENERAL 
In this thesis the author sets out to compare two current 
satellite communications programs: Military Strategic and 
Tactical Relay Satellite Communications System (MILSTAR) and 
the Ultra-High Frequency Follow-on Satellite System (UFO). 
Although the missions are officially different, it is this 
author's opinion that there is enough similar capability to 
warrant a comparison and to ask the question, !'Can the 
military afford to continue funding MILSTAR?" 
B .  BACKGROUND 
In the 1979 to 1981 timeframe, military and strategic 
planners recognized that existing satellite strategic 
communications systems were aging and in need of replacement. 
With the Soviet threat still in full bloom, a generation of 
satellites needed to be developed that could withstand a 
nuclear threat and be jam proof. The UHF spectrum was 
inundated with commercial as well as military users, and it 
was susceptible to jamming. 
A large acquisition of a space system was beginning. This 
was the MILSTAR system. Research and development was to 
encompass new technology in communications, computing, 
travelling wave tube amplification, and more. However, as 
1 
time passed, the budget dollars mounted and the MILSTAR 
program slowed. 
A second acquisition of a space system began in the mid 
l 8 O l s  with the Navy's desire to replace an aging Fleet 
Satellite Communications System (FLTSAT) and Leased Satellite 
Communications System (LEASAT) with the UFO system. Since 
MILSTAR had five years of research and development completed, 
the UFO program office could use some of the same requirements 
and not pay the same price for the technology. UFO and 
MILSTAR are the focus of this thesis. 
C .  METHODOLOGY 
This thesis examines these two satellite systems based on 
cost, capability, and orbit. The MILSTAR program is still 
considered sensitive, and exact figures were unavailable at an 
unclassified level. It is not the author's intent nor desire 
to look at a classified comparison of the two programs, as 
data available on the unclassified level proved sufficient for 
a reasonable contrast. The primary focus is on system 
similarity. 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
As stated previously, this is an unclassified thesis. It 
therefore contains some numbers which upon close inspection, 
may not be close to the same number shown in classified 
documents. If a number was used, the author tried to find it 
in two source documents to avoid any outliers. 
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E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Following this chapter, Chapters I1 and I11 describe the 
background, system requirements, satellite, spacecraft bus, 
payload, and ground control of MILSTAR and UFO. Chapter IV 
discusses the frequency used, including Extremely High 
Frequency (EHF) , Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) , and Super High 
Frequency (SHF). Additionally, some detrimental problems are 
discussed such as jamming, rain attenuation, and noise. 
Chapter V looks at the possible orbits available for the 
satellites. Finally, Chapter VI compares the two systems and 
concludes the thesis. 
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A.  BACKGROUND 
With the 21st centi 
11. UFO 
ry less than ten years a5 
satellite systems continue to be the United States 
a , UHF 
Navy I s 
workhorse in global tactical communications. Long standing 
programs, FLTSAT and Leased SATCOM satellite (LEASAT), still 
provide outstanding network availability, however, advancing 
age in these systems has forced the Government to procure 
replacement satellites. An industry-wide, competitive request ' 
for proposal in 1987 resulted in a 1988 fixed price contract 
award to the Space and Communications Group of Hughes Aircraft 
Company. The contract, which was named the UFO Satellite 
Program, calls for the design, manufacturing, integration, and 
testing of up to ten replacement satellites [Ref 13. 
A bold step in contracting procedures, the UFO program was 
unique for several reasons. Most significantly, the 
spacecraft contractor was tasked with procurement of launch 
vehicles, launch integration services, and the actual launch 
operations for the entire series of satellites. This new 
policy was in contrast to previous satellite programs where 
each phase was handled-by a different contractor [Ref 13. A 
DoD Inspector General (IG) study conducted between June and 
October of 1988 raised questions regarding UFO's projected 
costs and recommended holding funding until satisfactory 
4 
answers were provided to IG [Ref 13. Had the Navy not 
responded to IG's requests, IG recommended stopping the 
program. A halt in funding would have made the projected 
launch dates of late July 1992 through 1995 slip to an even 
later schedule. 
The actions identified by the IG were advisory in nature; 
however, if taken, the recommendations would have stopped full 
rate production. IG complained that the Navy did not provide 
an adequate: 
assessment of its satellite quantity requirements; 
justification for its nuclear hardening needs: 
manpower estimate, baseline description, and independent 
cost estimate; 
assessment of systems effectiveness and suitability 
supported by subsystem component testing; and 
Acquisition Strategy Report [Ref 13. 
With those discrepancies outstanding, the IG concluded 
that full rate production for UFO should not be approved for 
1989. Both the Navy and Operational Test and Evaluation at 
DoD responded quickly to the IG report. The Navy justified ' 
its position on satellite numbers, nuclear hardening, 
documentation, lack of responsiveness, and completion of 
operational test and evaluation with careful analysis and an 
interesting thank you to the IG: 
The Navy believes that all significant draft Report 
conclusions and recommendations have already been 
accommodated by decisions and directions resultant from the 
22 July Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) meeting. We 
suggested that the DoD IG update this report prior to the 
next scheduled UHF-FO DAB in August 1989. 
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i .  
No. Bandvvldth. EIRP. W. 1 dBBW, 
Prowled kHz d9W dEYK kHz 
1 25 28 -16 t 1 2  
2 25 28 -16 t 1 2  
15 25 26 -16 4-72 
21 5 20 -16 4 
The Navy appreciates the DoD IG team's assistance in 
ensuring that the UHF-FO program is a model of effective 
space system acquisition. We would be pleased to provide 
Operational Test and Evaluation made no editorial comments, 
but supported the Navy. The program was approved and Hughes 
is developing UFO [Ref 13. 
. additional information as necessary. [Ref 11. 
60dBBW, D y n m  PhaseUneanty. 
kHz Range.dE deg 
4 7 . 5  47 4-6 
-37.5 47 4 
A 7 . 5  47 4 
r 7 . 5  47 r 1 5  
B. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
Using performance requirements from the successfully 
proven FLTSAT and LEASAT programs, UFO requirements remain 
similar. Table 11-1 below summarizes payload performance 
requirements [Ref. 21. 
TABLE 11-1 
UFO PAYLOAD PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 
I-- Channel Type 
fleet bmedcaa 
Enhanced relay 




A significant upgrade in total channel capacity exists in 
that a single UFO satellite is equivalent to more than the sum 
of a FLTSAT plus a LEASAT. Additional requirements include 
full hardening for natural and full nuclear environments for 
a 14-year mission (10-year mean) and autonomous operation of 
all bus and payload functions, with the exception of station 
keeping maneuvers, for 30 days, without Telemetry, Tracking and 
Command (TT&C) contact. By contrast, FLTSAT was designed for 
a 5-year life and 14-day autonomous operation [Ref 2 1 .  
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U F O  is designed to be compatible with either shuttle or 
expendable launch vehicle services to eliminate launch delay 
from redesign or potential grounding of either type of launch 
vehicle such as was experienced after the Challenger disaster. 
The communications payload is significantly expanded, 
providing 3 9  UHF channels with 21 narrowband (5 KHz) relay 
channels, 17 wideband (25 K H z )  channels and one high power 25 
KHz fleet broadcast channel crossbanded from an SHF antijam 
uplink to a clear mode UHF downlink. U F O  provides a 
significantly larger number of narrowband unprocessed channels 
than either of its predecessors. The uplink supports a dual 
channel, anti-jam command, and broadcast capability 
simultaneously. UFO can provide from one to three multiplexed 
antijam broadcast uplinks that can be crossbanded to three 
preselected UHF wideband downlink channels and can operate in 
the normal single channel fleet broadcast mode [Ref 21. 
From the fourth through the tenth satellite in the series, 
a MILSTAR compatible EHF payload upgrade will be installed. 
The U F O  EHF package will include fixed earth-coverage antennas 
and a steerable 5' spot beam antenna. The E H F  package will 
provide a spread-spectrum processed, jam-resistant COM/TT&C 
capability to supplement the MILSTAR user capability [Ref 21. 
C. SATELLITE 
Figure 11-1 is the actual on-orbit configuration of the 
Hughes U F O  satellite. The satellite is capable of supporting 
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Figure 11-1 
UHF Follow-On Satellite On-Orbit Configuration 
500 to 1500 pounds of payload in geosynchronous orbit and 
supplying between 1500 to 6000 watts of dc power during 
sunlight or eclipse [Ref 2 1 .  
The first four satellites are the basic UHF/SHF 
configuration weighing approximately 850 pounds and requiring 
1600 watts of power. Atlas Centaur I will launch these 
vehicles to orbit. The satellites containing the EHF upgrade 
will have an additional 450 pounds and 350 watts required. The 
upgrade will be launched to orbit by the Atlas I1 [Ref 23. 
Satellite orientation is normal to the equatorial orbit 
plane, with solar panels pointing north-south and the UHF 
8 
transmit antenna array facing the earth. The receive antenna 
is located on a boom extending from the west face of the 
vehicle. Two earth coverage horn antennas are mounted on the 
east rim of the transmit antenna to provide transmit and 
receive coverage for the SHF (7 to 8 GHz) antijam TT&C 
communication. Telemetry service and backup command and 
ranging communications for transfer orbit or emergency 
operations are provided by dual S-band omni-directional 
antennas. The TT&C antennas are placed such that they provide 
hemispherical coverage and will be controllable from the 
satellite operations center in Colorado Springs [ R e f  21. 
D. SPACECRAFT BUS MODULE 
Another design innovation in the U F O  project is its 
modular design. By using a modular system, parallel 
integration and testing of payload and spacecraft bus modules 
are possible. Time and money are both saved by using this 
unique design technique. Figure 11-2 is an exploded view of 
the UFO satellite and details the spacecraft structure and the 
major components. The propulsion module supports four 
propulsion system tanks. The subsystem uses bi-propellant 
propulsion/ attitude control thrusters for orbit injection and 
on-orbit attitude and stationkeeping control. A central 100 
pound thruster serves as a liquid apogee engine for perigee 
raising to achieve final orbit circularization. More small 
thrusters are included in the package to account for trim and , 
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Figure 11-2 
Exploded View of U H F  Follow-On Satellite 
on-station control. Additionally, redundant mqmentum wheels 
are also included [Ref 2 1 .  
The bus shelf provides support for four multi-cell battery 
packs at each corner of the module. Bus electronics units are 
also mounted on the equipment shelf. Power control 
electronics include battery charge and discharge units. 
Attitude controls are redundant three-axis rate-gyro packages 
which act in tandem with a redundant centralized satellite 
control processor (SCP) and an attitude control sensor group 
to control satellite attitude. The SCP also controls solar 
panels, monitors payload configuration, and conducts fault 
sensing to achieve autonomous operation for up to 30 days. 
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A pair of radiation detector units are located on the east 
and west faces of the bus module to provide four-pi steradian 
coverage and nuclear event detection signals to the SCP and 
spacecraft command decoder units ( C D U ) .  If a nuclear event 
occurred, the spacecraft would initiate procedures to 
circumvent, and then in post attack autonomously reconfigure, 
spacecraft and payload components [ R e f  21. 
E. PAYLOAD MODULE AND CONFIGURATION I 
Figure 11-3 depicts the communications payload module. A 
three panel design, the module actually splits the communi- 
cations payload into compartments. By splitting into separate 
compartments, the high power amplifiers which run hot are 
separated from the payload components which run cool resulting 
in a more steady state temperature schedule for each 
component. Figure 11-4 describes in a simple line diagram 
the UFO communication payload. The payload consists of the 
UHF communications plus S-band and SHF TT&C transponder 
equipment, which provide communication links for secure TT&C 
of bus and payload functions during initial orbital insertion 
and on-station operations [Ref 2 1 .  The multichannel design is 
to add more capability to the fleet user and provide secure 
back-ups to UHF communication. 
Two problems had to be overcome for the communication 
payload to be effective. The first problem, intermodulation 
(IM) products, has been a problem in high powered UHF 
satellites -- FLTSAT, LEASAT and UFO. The design team needed 
11 
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Figure 11-3 
Communications Payload Module 
to develop an antenna which minimized spacecraft illumination 
Hughes chose an array of short back- 
fire elements which would achieve a smaller IM interference 
rate [Ref 2 1 .  
by UHF radiated power. 
The second problem was the requirement to meet stringent 
out of band interference limits in the frequency bands 
adjoining the assigned downlink frequencies. These limits 
impose challenging requirements on downlink transmitter 
linearity that require operating the power amplifier at a 
point where the drive is backed off significantly relative to 
saturation to reduce out of band I M s .  
The SHF payload, as well as the S-band TT&C communications 
group, are not new technology. The former was designed by 





and is. virtually identical to transponders provided 
for FLTSAT, GPS, DSCSIII and MILSTAR [Ref 21 .  
UFO's communication frequency plan will be discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
F a  GROUND CONTROL/TERMINALS 
The United States government, and most notably the Navy, 
has a significant investment in U H F  satellite communication 
equipment. Military/Department of Defense dependence on these 
assets is a consideration when looking at replacement. For 
13 
example, more than 6500 highly reliable AN/WSC-3 UHF terminals 
have been deployed [Ref 2 1 .  
With the current group of UHF FLTSATCOM satellite9 
reaching the end of their useful life, replacement with 
upgraded secure satellites is critical. The follow-on program 
for U H F  SATCOM will need to employ cost effective approaches 
providing additional channels that also can reduce 
susceptibility to interference and low-level jamming. Current 
technology provides for making U H F  SATCOM channels unavailable 
to unauthorized users with minimal cost impact and simple 
modifications to the current earth terminals. With the Navy's 
large investment in shipboard UHF systems, the upgrade must 
expand on existing capability [Ref 2 1 .  
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111. MILSTAR 
A.  BACKGROUND 
MILSTAR is jointly sponsored by the Air Force, Army, and 
Navy. The system is designed to meet the minimum essential 
wartime communication needs of the President and Commanders- 
in-Chief (CINCS) to command and control our strategic and 
tactical forces through all levels of conflict. 
MILSTAR'S origin arose out of the debates between 1979 and 
1981 over which satellite communication system should replace 
the in-place Air Force Satellite Communication (SATCOM) 
system. Several options proposed by the Air Force were 
defeated in budget battles until finally in 1981 the Reagan 
Administration cleared the way for an across-the-board 
military upgrade. The Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence ( C 3 1 )  ) 
stated the President had given strategic C I  top priority in 
modernization [Ref 3 1 .  
3 
The strategic modernization plan, as it was called, 
consisted of five elements: 
1) Improvements in communications and control systems, 
2) Modernization of strategic bombers, 
3 )  Deployment of new submarine launched missiles, 
4) Phased introduction of new land-based MX missiles, and 
5) Improvements to strategic defenses. [Ref 3 1 .  
With a mandate from DoD to build a new communication system, 
the Air Force assumed the lead in MILSTAR development. New 
15 
systems historically take years to proceed through the first 
milestones in the procurement process. MILSTAR proceeded 
slowly from 1982 to 1988 with design proposals, engineering 
developments, research, and contract awards. In 1982, $48 
million was allocated to Advanced Space Communication and Air 
Force Satellite Communication System. Lockheed Missiles and 
Space Company was awarded $1.05 billion for full scale 
engineering development [Ref 4 1 .  
MILSTAR has continually slipped behind the original 
schedule and as a result has suffered cost overruns. The 
overruns essentially doubled previous delivery estimates. In 
May 1988 the Air Force released a revised cost estimate of $1 
billion for each satellite/booster combination. [Ref 4 1 .  
MILSTAR began as a special-access or black program with 
many of its capabilities still shrouded in secrecy. What is 
not a secret is the fact that MILSTAR is a first real attempt 
at global communications in the Extremely High Frequency (EHF) 
range. The Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) 
system currently being operated is in the super-high frequency 
(SHF) and ultra-high frequency (UHF) ranges. MILSTAR is 
designed to be compatible with the older systems. 
As in any design, trade-offs have been made. A s  big, 
expensive, versatile and survivable as MILSTAR truly is, it 
will be unable to handle high data rates and a plethora of 
users. The bottom line is that the Air Force is spending 
billions of dollars for a system intended to supplement, not 
16 
replace existing communications systems/satellites. MILSTAR'S 
role or value is in its ability to still be flying long after 
the Navy's Fleet Satellite Communication System (FLTSATCOM) or 
the Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) is over- 
burdened, jammed or destroyed. 
B. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
A 1983 estimate of the MILSTAR channel capacity is for 50 
EHF channels and 4 UHF channels to maintain compatibility with 
existing systems. It will provide low data rate teletype at 
either 75 or 2 4 0 0  bits per second [ R e f  51. The shift to the 
EHF band is partly due to the fact that the UHF and SHF bands 
are inundated with military and commercial users. The large 
number of users in U H F  and SHF has left very few operating or 
bandwidth windows available f o r  the dedicated user [Ref 51.  
MILSTAR is designed f o r  a 10 year average mission life. 
The satellite's primary downlink will operate at 20 GHz while 
the primary uplink will be at 44 GHz. A 1 GHz bandwidth is 
used to achieve spread spectrum which makes MILSTAR almost 
unjammable. Crosslinks will operate at 60 GHz which will make 
the earth essentially opaque. Crosslink communications 
(satellite-to-satellite) are therefore secure from any earth 
snooping. Satellites in the path, however, could potentially 
collect the signal; yet without decryption or knowledge of 
transmission, the intercept would potentially sound like noise 
and be discarded. 
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Additional requirements include anti-jamming, surviv- 
ability, adaptive antenna technology which includes uplink 
nulling and steerable downlinks. (The actual frequencies and 
spread spectrum techniques will be discussed in Chapter IV). 
More features include crosslinks between satellites, 
communications security, error corrections, encoding and 
encryption. MILSTAR is also projected to be hardened against 
threats such as high-powered lasers and electromagnetic pulse 
(EMP) which is t o  say it will have a nuclear survivability 
capability [Ref 5 and 61.  
MILSTAR will also possess the capability to communicate in 
the UHF spectrum to maintain interoperability with existing 
SATCOM systems and ground stations. The UHF portion will not 
be the low data rate that MILSTAR'S EHF side will have. 
C .  SATELLITE 
Although a picture of the proposed MILSTAR satellite is 
unavailable at the unclassified level, some of the satellite's 
estimated specifications are provided. The Fleet EHF package 
( F E P )  currently flown on FLTSAT 7 and 8 weighs approximately 
245 pounds with 305 watts of payload power. F E P  was designed 
to test the feasibility of EHF communications in the space 
environment. Since F E P  represents only a small portion of the 
MILSTAR package, estimates of total dc power in sunlight or 
eclipse produced on MILSTAR range from 1000 to 6000 watts and 
a satellite weight of between 5000 and 8000 pounds [Ref 2 and 
51.  
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Contributing to MILSTAR'S already high costs are the 
paucity of'launch vehicles in the United States inventory. 
Since the Challenger disaster a shortfall in rocket boosters 
and lengthy delays in placing space systems in orbit have 
occurred. MILSTAR'S first seven satellites are currently 
scheduled to be boosted to orbit using the Titan IV with a 
Centaur upper stage [Ref 6 1 .  
The original plan was to launch MILSTAR aboard Shuttle 
with Boeing Inertial Upper Stages (IUS) to take the satellites 
to geosynchronous orbit., The early estimates put the weight 
of MILSTAR at 5000 pounds which is the throw weight limit of 
the IUS. With the Centaur upper stage developed by General 
Dynamics, 8000 pounds could be boosted to orbit which led the 
Air Force to opt for the more capable launch vehicle. 
Extensive studies by Communications Systems Engineering 
and Integration Center looked carefully at Molniya, Geosyn- 
chronous, Low Earth and Global Positioning Systems orbits [Ref 
7 1 .  Defense Electronics published an article in the February 
1989 issue describing the proposed MILSTAR orbit plan. With 
seven satellites in orbit at all times a combination of highly 
elliptical polar orbits for three satellites coupled with four 
in geosynchronous would provide continuous global coverage. 
Additional robustness would be achieved by having a minimum of 
two on-orbit spares with ready-to-fly spares positioned for 
quick replacement. The on-orbit spares would be ltparkedl1 in 
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high orbits [Ref 41. A detailed analysis of the various 
orbits will be discussed in Chapter V. 
D. SPACECRAFT B U S  MODULE 
A considerable amount of new technology is being developed 
for use in MILSTAR, however, attitude control and station 
keeping is state of the art. Hughes Aircraft has developed 
the controls for both UFO and MILSTAR and with minor 
differences one could almost say they were the same [Ref 81. 
The cornerstone to the spacecraft bus is the fault 
tolerant computer which should be capable of controlling the 
satellite autonomously f o r  lengthy periods. The latest in 
computer technology will employ a myriad of techniques to 
control advanced adaptive antennas, nulling antennas, 
radiation detector units, conduct fault sensing and isolation, 
and monitor the payload configuration [Ref 91. In addition to 
the capabilities previously mentioned, the computer also 
controls the self defenses which include chaff and ECM 
features. The redundant design of the system serves to 
reinforce the main goal of MILSTAR -- survivability [Ref 91. 
E. PAYLOAD MODULE AND CONFIGURATION 
The data for this section is unavailable in unclassified 
documents. 
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F. GROUND CONTROL/TERMINALS 
A s  MILSTAR gets closer to orbit the Air Force, Army, and 
Navy will need to be totally completed with testing the ground I 
terminals. The most ambitious plan for linking MILSTAR with 
the ground resides in the Air Force. ' Plans for MILSTAR 
terminals include: B - l B ,  B - 5 2 ,  EC-135, RC-135, E - 4 B ,  and E-6A 
aircraft, as well as' fixed ground sites. The major Air Force 
site will be the MILSTAR ground control station in Colorado 
Springs, Colorado. 
The Army spent $105.8 million in 1986 on a firm fixed 
price contract with Magnavox Electronic Systems Co. to produce 
fifteen Single-Channel Objective Tactical Terminals (SCOTT). 
The SCOTT equipment has been delivered and used operationally 
during Desert Storm [Ref 4 1 .  Results and performance figures 
have not been released on an unclassified level. A production 
contract award to Magnavox is a pretty good indicator that 
SCOTT functioned as expected. Prior to the operational 
testing of SCOTT equipment the program was in trouble in 
Congress. In the fiscal 1989 Defense Authorization Bill SCOTT 
production funds were slashed from $55 million to zero [Ref 
4 1 .  The resultant ripple through the procurement system 
potentially added $6 million to $10 million in cost to the 
program. The loss of a year's worth of work, the inability to 
procure raw materials, the value of 1989 dollars versus 1990 
dollars all contributed to raising the price of the final 
deliverable. 
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The Navy has moved forward with a series of tests and 
operationally verified some of MILSTAR'S hardware and software 
applique packages. Naval Satellite Operation Center, Pt. 
Mugu, California has taken the lead in testing MILSTAR 
equipment during operational testing of the Fleet EHF package 
flown on FLTSAT-7 and FLTSAT-8. Navy terminals completed more 
than 250 operational tests for compatibility and inter- 
operability in 1988 and continued the testing throughout 
Desert Shield/Storm. In the Desert Shield environment the 
system proved more than satisfactory. The only test 
uncompleted by the Navy is the satellite to satellite cross- 
link [Ref 4 1 .  
MILSTAR has many strengths and yet it has been delayed 
each year by refinement, more engineering, money problems, and 
finally the fact that it is not quite ready. The research and 
development budget for MILSTAR is expected to rise to more 
than $700 million per year in the early 90's. Concurrently 
MILSTAR'S procurement budget is expected to exceed $460 
million annually [Ref 4 1 .  The constellation will ultimately 
cost in excess of $10 billion on orbit. The design is now 
llfrozenlf, however, more contractors can become involved by 
continuing to develop the ground equipment that will replace 
what is rapidly becoming obsolete [Ref 4 1 .  
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IV. FREQUENCY 
A.  BACKGROUND 
The military historically has been the group that has 
desired the most diverse communications capability since the 
invention of the radio telephone. The use of all available 
frequencies from extremely low frequencies to the extremely 
high frequencies puts a special demand on the manufacturer to 
maintain military communications on the leading edge of 
technology. 
Radio frequency from 3 to 30 MHz by convention is called 
high-frequency radio (HF). HF was the mainstay of military 
communications until satellite communications were developed 
[Ref 101. In HF communications a groundwave and skywave 
component characterized the waveform. A peculiar phenomenon 
I ,  
in HF communications is its ability to 'skip' or refract on 
the ionosphere thereby producing extremely long ranges with a 
smail. amount (1-2W) of radiated power [Ref 101. HF 
communications remain a primary backup for all major 
communications in the Navy today with monthly tests conducted 
by all ships. 
Since HF communications refract off the ionosphere a need 
developed f o r  a more secure means of communicating. Whenever 
an HF transmitter is operated, people that possess direction 
finding equipment are able to pinpoint the source of the 
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transmission. The evolution in communications required a more 
secure method of operation. Line of sight communications were 
developed to provide more security and a higher data rate. 
Above 3 0  MHz three main frequency areas were developed: 
Ultra-High Frequency (UHF), Super High Frequency (SHF) and 
finally Extremely High Frequency (EHF). In this analysis the 
lower end will be referred to as centimeter wave technology, 
to include microwave, while the upper end will be referred to 
as millimeter wave technology. Additionally, frequencies 
above 60 GHz will not be discussed since MILSTAR operates 
between 2 0  and 44 GHz. 
As a result of the unreliability of communications which 
used the ionosphere for propagation, the UHF MILSATCOM came 
into being. The Navy portion of the FLTSATCOM system evolved 
into nine hard-limited, 25 KHz bandwidth, frequency-translated 
UHF communications channels and one channel that has an SHF 
anti-jamming uplink for the important jam-protected# 
communications information that is broadcast to the Fleet on 
a narrow-band UHF downlink [Ref 2 1 .  The system has been cost 
effective and reliable; however, outside of the fleet 
broadcast service, the nine translation channels are very 
sensitive to interference. Disruptions in communications 
happen frequently as a result of overlap, open or hot 
microphones and generally inadvertent errors [Ref. 101. 
Suffice it to say it takes very little effort to jam or 
interfere with any of the translation channels. Some 
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estimates indicate that lost service each year due to UHF 
SATCOM interference represents a loss of millions of dollars 
to the Navy [Ref 13. 
B. EHF 
Reference Data for Radio Enqineers states that the 3 - 3 0  
GHz frequency range is centimetric waves and the 30-300 GHz 
frequency range is in the millimetric range [Ref lo]. The 
Telecommunication Transmission Handbook refers to the 13 GHz 
to 100 GHz spectrum as millimeter wave [Ref 101. For 
continuity and since MILSTAR operates between 20 and 4 4  GHz, 
the author will consider MILSTAR'S operating frequency to be 
millimeter wave. 
When designing a transmitter, whether on earth or for 
satellite use, a main concern for the engineer is pro- 
pagation. Millimeter wave transmission through the atmosphere 
is more adversely affected by certain propagation properties 
than its centimeter counterpart. These properties are the 
absorption and scattering of a wave as it is transmitted 
through the atmosphere. The result of this phenomenon is one 
reason millimeter wave has not been extensively used in 
satellite communications, until recently [Ref 101. 
One of the reasons for the renewed interest in millimeter 
wave technology is the increasing congestion in the centimeter 
wave bands. A second reason is the need for much greater 
bandwidth to accommodate digital transmission or spread 
spectrum waveforms. Finally, research and development 
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primarily driven by the military has placed millimeter wave 
technology in roughly the same position as centimeter wave 
technology in the late ~ O ' S ,  when that region of the spectrum 
was opened for wide usage [Ref 101. 
1. Rainfall L o s s  
The ideal for the transmission system engineer would 
be to create a formula which would be valid anywhere on earth 
and would provide path loss in decibels. In free space such 
a formula is available: Attenuation (dB) = 3.244 + 20 logf + 
20 logD where D = hop or path length (Km) and f = operating 
frequency (MHz) [Ref 101. With millimeter wave transmission 
one must add in five extra variables to account for water 
vapor, mist and fog, oxygen ( O ? ) ,  sum of the absorption losses 
due to other gases, and losses due to rainfall [Ref 101. 
The principal factor causing excess attenuation is 
due to the losses brought on by rainfall. Looking at the 
downlink frequency of 20 GHz f o r  MILSTAR (1.5 cm), excess 
attenuation caused by water vapor accumulates at only .1 dB/Km 
and for a 10 Km path only 1.0 dB must be added to an already 
large free space loss [Ref 101. Rain, however, is another 
matter. Common practice has been to express path loss due to 
rain as a function of the precipitation rate. The generally 
accepted equation for rain attenuation is: A = aR where A = 
the attenuation in dB, R = the rain rate, and a and b = 
functions of the frequency and the propagation path lengths 
b 
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[Ref 111. Two methods for determining rain rate have been 
employed in computations for MILSTAR'S frequency ranges. 
The first approach, the Rice and Holmberg method, 
employs a derived equation which takes into account total 
average annual rainfall and the ratio of the thunderstorm 
annual rain to the total annual rain. The method requires 
data f o r  the average annual rainfall and the thunderstorm 
ratio for the location. A second equation is then employed to 
determine a set of curves which then yield loss due to 
rainfall [Ref. 111. 
The second approach, developed by R.K. Crane, 
provides eight different rain rate regions to describe the 
weather in any part of the world. The basic function of the 
Crane method is to give an estimate over a large area, and so 
it may ultimately be inaccurate in any local area. [Ref 111. 
Irrespective of which method is used, the results 
must be recognized as an average estimate. Considerable 
operational variations from this estimate could force use of 
alternative methods: however, short-term variations are to be 
expected [Ref 111. 
With these factors in mind, eight locations were 
selected that favor a synchronous orbit telemetry tracking and 
control subsystem where high antenna elevation angles are 
desired. The locations selected are: Norfolk, Virginia; 
Virgin Islands: Ascension Island; Naples, Italy: Diego Garcia; 
Guam; Hawaii: and Stockton, California. Computer runs were 
27 
conducted for these locations for elevations angles of Zoo, 
30°, 40°, 50°, 6 0 ° ,  7 0 ° ,  and 90'. Both previously discussed 
methods for calculation of rain loss were used. Tables IV-1 
and IV-2 are examples of both methods [Ref 111. 
With the data from this study and others using 
similar assumptions, rain l o s s  was determined to be a 
consideration rather than a limitation in building an EHF 
communication satellite. The curves indicate that a clear 
weather margin is required to offset statistical rain 
absorption effects to achieve 99% circuit availabilities. The 
general conclusion is that for the 44 GHz uplink, a clear 
weather margin of 16 dB is necessary for 99% availability at 
a 20' elevation angle to allow for rain absorption effects 
[Ref 111. The impact of the rain attenuation study on both 
UFO and MILSTAR is that power requirements will be much higher 
to achieve the necessary margin [Ref. 111. When compared to 
SHF, the EHF Telemetry Tracking & Control (TT&C) package has 
a severe weather penalty. The largest Navy EHF terminal, the 
AN/USC-38 (V) shore terminal, does not provide adequate gain 
and/or Effective Isotropic Radiated Power (EIRP) to provide 
reliable TT&C without extensive modifications [Ref 111. 
2 .  Jamming 
The free use of the electromagnetic spectrum has 
become a top priority in military communications. Since the 
development of various jamming techniques from spot jamming to 
the broader barrage-type jamming, communication engineers and 
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TABLE IV-2 
RAIN ATTENUATION STATISTICS USING CRANE'S 8 AREA METHOD 
EARTH STATION LOCATED AT STOCKTON, CA 
EARTH STATION LATITUDE = 38 DEGREES, ELEVATION = 40 DEGREES 
UPLINK FREQUENCY = 44.5 GHZ; DOWNLINK FREQUENCY = 20.5 GHZ 
RAIN RATE CLIMATE REGION IS C 
TIME ATTENUATION EXCEEDED 
YEARLY HOURS UPLINK DOWNLINK 
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Electronic Warfare specialists have looked to development of 
jam resistant equipment. 
Uplink jamming protection is most critical for SATCOM 
operations to preserve satellite control. Downlink jammers 
are at a disadvantage since they must be in the local area of 
each user, even though they have a significant range advantage 
when they are in the area. EHF uplinks protected with large 
anti-jamming (AJ) margins can be cross-connected on board the 
satellite to unprotected UHF downlink channels to provide 
connectivity to the large number of existing UHF terminals 
[Ref 121. 
Part of the attraction of EHF frequencies for 
communications is that the propagation medium itself appears 
to offer an AJ capability particularly for ground based 
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jammers [Ref 121. An analysis conducted at Georgia Tech 
Research Institute reveals that EHF is capable of withstanding 
jamming in both stand-off and close-in cases. In the stand- 
off scenario the jammer is postulated to be 20 Krn from the 
communications transmitter. Figures IV-1 (A-H) represent 
plots for the communications receiver at various ranges 
between transmitter and jammer [Ref 121. Two weather 
conditions, clear air and rain, are used for evaluation. In 
the clear air case, Figure IV-1 (E) , one frequency 52.5 GHz 
optimizes the Signal to Jamming p l u s  Noise ( S / ( J + N ) )  ratio. 
The optimization is a result of sufficient atmospheric 
absorption to significantly reduce the jamming signal to the 
point where the natural noise term, N, dominates the jamming 
term, J, over short link ranges. For frequencies under the 
optimum, jamming power becomes significant over short ranges 
[Ref 121. 
For the close-in jammer, the jammer is located at 5 
Km from the transmitter. In the clear air case, Figure IV-1 
(G), there are two different regions of optimization. In the 
case of rain, Figure IV-1 (H), frequencies which exhibit 
higher specific attenuations are suboptimum at all ranges 
[Ref 121. 
By using spread spectrum, MILSTAR will be able to 
select an operating frequency that will exploit the commun- 
ication system range advantage by using 
llmaskll the jammer, while maintaining a 
excess attenuation to 
shorter path for the 
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communication signal. In the close-in scenario, the optimum 
frequency will be the one that leads to a high specific excess 
attenuation when there is a communications range advantage 
[Ref 121. 
3. Spread-Spectrum 
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) is the subject 
of at least five separate studies presented at the MILCOM 90 
Conference. It is the unique waveform being developed for 
MILSTAR that significantly enhances the low probability of 
intercept in the communications bands. A straightforward 
procedure has been developed for masking spread-spectrum 
signals by intentionally adding non-stationary noise of 
relatively low power [Ref 1 3 1 .  
DSSS waveforms are usually considered to be similar 
to noise processes due to their creation through the use of 
psuedo-noise generators. In MILSTAR's case 1 GHz of bandwidth 
is used to spread the signal out and make it virtually 
undetectable from the noise [Ref 131. 
Spread spectrum signals are known to be detectable 
using non-linear processing such as chip rate line and carrier 
harmonic detectors. MILSTAR's waveform becomes undetectable 
because the goal of a featureless waveform is achieved. With 
no features, rate line and carrier detection is impossible to 
any order of non-linearity with or without memory [Ref 131. 
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C .  UHF AND SHF 
Military UHF ( 2 2 5  to 400 MHz) and SHF (7 to 8 GHz) 
communications are the primary frequencies used for DoDtoday. 
With jam resistance and spread spectrum being the major 
advantage to EHF, U H F  requires a significant technology boost 
to remain a viable communication alternative [Ref 21. 
UHF signals have a history of being very jammable, if not 
by a determined adversary then by the systems themselves. 
Open microphones have disrupted Battle Group communications 
for hours with numerous lost manhours isolating the faulty 
equipment. U F O  attempts to tackle some satellite hardware 
problems between transmit and receive antennas. Projected 
locations for receive and transmit antennas provide a high 
degree of isolation to allow maximum efficiency in each 
satellite [Ref 2 1 .  
Since the UHF spectrum is extremely crowded, the potential 
for interference exists due to the close proximity of users in 
the frequency ranges to be used. Figure IV-2 graphically 
depicts the close proximity to Soviet communications that UFO 
will be operating. The uplink and downlink frequencies have 
been chosen to minimize mutual interference and gain the most 
use of assigned bandwidth. The new plan actually upgrades and 
diversifies the existing channel assignments for FLTSAT and 
LEASAT [Ref 2 1 .  
The receivers 
individual uplink 
are designed to process four groups of 
channels having uniform bandwidth and 
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Figure IV-2 
UHF Communications Frequency Plan 
uplink/downlink offset frequency assignments. The receiver 
input contains a preselect filter and downconverter assembly, 
which drives a bank of eight to 13 intermediate frequency 
amp1 i f ier/ 1 imiter strips. The limiter output signals are 
combined in groups and upconverted to the assigned UHF 
downlink frequency. Timing is controlled by a frequency 
synthesizer in each receiver which selects one of four preset 
frequency plans by ground command. The four plans allow pairs 
of UFO satellites to operate at each of the four assigned 
longitude slots without mutual interference [Ref 21. 
Jamming and noise or interference are two areas that have 
continually plagued UHF communications. A potential source 
for interference in the UFO satellite is the close proximity 
of the UFO uplink and downlink frequencies to USSR 
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requirements. The stringent limitation of the out of band 
noise and interference which can be radiated by UFO's payload 
made it possible to develop the frequency plan as indicated in 
Figure IV-2. 
Another potential source for noise is in the thermal 
spectrum. A technology feature of UFO is to use the active 
temperature control in the receiver to minimize the variation 
in gain with temperature of each channel. A secondary source, 
ground command, can control gain which will be used to 
compensate for variations during the satellite's lifetime [Ref 
111. 
Advances in component technology also add extra advantage 
to the satellite. Specifically, solid state power amplifiers, 
low power amplifiers, medium power amplifiers, high power 
amplifiers, and channelization filters have been upgraded with 
one major goal which is to reduce interference. [Ref 111. 
One final source for noise is the Continuous Wave (CW) 
variety. CW can be caused by a variety of sources and 
therefore control of CW interference is more difficult [Ref 
111. 
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V. ORBITS 
A.  BACKGROUND 
Choosing the proper orbit to maximize coverage and 
minimize gaps has been the subject of extensive studies for 
both UFO and MILSTAR. Five orbits have been chosen to 
evaluate the orbital dynamics on the EHF packages as well as 
UHF coverage areas. These orbits range from a low earth orbit 
to inclined geosynchronous. Additionally, two highly 
eccentric Molniya orbits and the half-synchronous Global 
Position System (GPS) orbit are considered [Ref 7 1 .  Table V-1 
contains the parameters for these orbits. 
Orbit. 
TABLE V-1 
PARAMETERS O F  CANDIDATE EHF ORBITS 
Inclination Apogee Perigee Semi Major Eccen- Repeating 
Height 0 Height Axis tricrty Ground - 
NM NM NM Track 
GEOSYNCHRONOUS 0",60" 19323 19323 22767 0 Yes 
24 HR MOLNIYA 63.435" 38260 378 22767 .a321 Yes 
12 HR MOWIYA K3.435" 21416 378 14352 .7335 Yes 
GPS 55" 10898 10898 14352 0 Yes 
LOW EARTH ORBITS 0"-90' 80-1000 80-1000 3525-4445 Variable No 
The most stringent orbital requirements occur f o r  the 
proposed EHF packages. The reason for these requirements is 
in the proposed 24-hour global coverage, communication cross- 
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link capability, polar positioning, and anti-jam/low 
probability of intercept in the MILSTAR program. UFO does not 
approximate the ambitiousness of this coverage, however, the 
data for geosynchronous and low earth orbit applies equally 
well. Groundtrack and coverage will be discussed for each of 
the five orbits with some additional characteristics included 
in tabular form. 
A satellite's groundtrack is the locus of intersections 
over one period of the spacecraft position vector with the 
Earth's surface. Simply stated, it is the path on the globe 
for which the satellite is directly overhead. Besides 
detailing information on the orbit with respect to earth, the 
groundtrack aids in visualizing the coverage patterns of a 
particular orbital configuration [Ref 71.  
Coverage plots presented in this thesis were generated 
using a computer program which projects a satellite through a 
twenty-four hour period. Statistics are kept which ailow 
calculation for the amount of time a satellite is visible at 
each discrete latitude-longitude point. The visibility time 
per day is pictured for each satellite in the form of a 
contour plot. Each dark line represents a particular coverage 
time in hours/day. The resolution for the plots are five 
degrees in latitude and longitude [Ref 7 1 .  
For purposes of this thesis, coverage is constrained by 
the requirement that a spacecraft be at least 20' above the 
local horizon to ensure visibility. Although the indicated 
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coverage regions are for a particular right ascension of the 
ascending node (the point on the equator where the orbit 
crosses the equatorial plane in a northerly direction), the 
same contour patterms apply to any node. 
B. GEOSYNCHRONOUS 
A geosynchronous orbit is one whose period is matched to 
the Earth's station. An altitude of 19,323 nautical miles 
(NM) is required for a circular orbit to maintain a match with 
the Earth's rotation. A non-inclined geosynchronous orbit 
remains fixed over a point on the equator and is termed 
geostationary. Continuous coverage of the hemisphere of 
interest is available with this orbit. The amount of coverage 
is dependant on elevation angle constraints [Ref 7 1 .  
An inclined geosynchronous orbit produces a figure-eight 
groundtrack (Figure V-1). The amount of movement is limited 
to a relatively small range of longitudes about the node and 
latitude excursions equal to the inclination. The ground- 
track of an inclined geosynchronous satellite repeats daily. 
Coverage of higher latitudes is achieved, however, continuous 
visibility is substantially reduced or eliminated depending on 
elevation angle requirements. Figure V-2 is a representation 
of an inclined geosynchronous orbit. 
Figure V - 3  is an inclined geosynchronous orbit with a 20' 
elevation angle constraint. Note that near continuous 
coverage is achieved at the equator and greater than eight- 
hou,r coverage exists near the poles in 120' of longitude.. The 
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Figure V-1 
Inclined Geosynchronous Groundtrack 
Figure V-2 
Inclined Geosynchronous Orbit 
orbital elements for inclined geosynchronous orbit are 
tabulated in Table V-2. 
C .  TWENTY-FOUR HOUR MOLNIYA 
Orbital perturbations occur in satellites due to the 
They produce an apsidal rotation which in Earth's oblateness. 
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Figure V-3 
Inclined Geosynchronous Visibility 
TABLE V-2 
INCLINED GEOSYNCHRONOUS ORBITAL ELEMENTS 
semimajor axis 22767 NM 
eccentricity 0.0 
inclination 60.0 degrees 
argument of perigee N/A 
effect rotates the line connecting perigee and apogee about 
the angular momentum vector. The apsidal rotation especially 
affects highly eccentric orbits in which the spacecraft is 
designed to loiter at apogee literally appearing to hover over 
a fixed point on Earth. The inertial movement of the apsis 
prohibits this, without extensive stationkeeping [Ref 71.  
There is, however, a critical inclination at which the 
earth's perturbative forces combine such that they actually 
cancel rotation of the apsis. The class of orbits which 
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reside at this inclination are known as Molniya orbits. The 
value of the critical inclination is 6 3 . 4 3 5 '  [Ref 71. 
The twenty-four hour Molniya orbit delivers a closed 
groundtrack. Figure V-3 depicts a typical groundtrack for 
this orbit. As can be seen by the figure, this orbit is not 
limited to a small range of longitudes. Instead, the Molniya 
: . :  
! 
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Figure V-3 
24-Hour Molniya Groundtrack 
track covers half the globe. This particular plot represents 
a satellite with apogee positioned over the northwest Soviet 
Union. With each dot representing six minute intervals in 
satellite position, one can easily see the loiter phenomenon 
in the Northern Hemisphere and the non-existent coverage in 
the Southern Hemisphere. At apogee this satellite is 
extremely high (38,000 NM) while at perigee it is very low 
( 3 8 0  NM) and moving very quickly. 
Figure V-4 depicts the 20' elevation angle constraint and 
the plot, though busy, depicts the high coverage attainable in 
northern latitudes. Twenty hours per day or better coverage 
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is available at latitudes above 65', with greater than six 
hours per day coverage available for the entire northeast 
quadrant. An additional bonus with this satellite is its 
ability to simultaneously cover both East and West hemispheres 
due to the 38,000 NM apogee. Table V - 3  depicts the twenty- 
four hour Molniya orbital elements. 
Figure V-4 
24-Hour Molniya Coverage Visibility 
TABLE V-3 
24-HOUR MOLNIYA ORBITAL ELEMENTS 
semimajor axis 22767 NM 
eccentricity 0.8321 
inclination 63.435 degrees 
argument of perigee 270.0 degrees 
D. TWELVE HOUR MOLNIYA 
Figure V - 5  portrays the twelve hour Molniya orbit. The 
unique feature of the twelve hour orbit is that the ground- 
track repeats itself identically daily. The effect achieved, 




occur, one over Iceland and the other over Kamchatka. Figure 
V-6 is a graphic comparison of the twelve and twenty four hour 
Molniya orbit. Note that the twelve-hour orbit has a 
considerably lower apogee which produces the orbital period as 
a multiple of the Earth's rotation rate [Ref 71. 
Molniya 
Figure V-6 
12-Hour/24-Hour Molniya Orbit 
Figure V-7 constrains the elevation angle to 20'. The 
lower contour line of this figure represents six hours per day 
45 
Figure V-7 
12-Hour Molniya Coverage Visibility 
visibility and the upper contour indicates eighteen hours per 
day. The best coverage at higher latitudes occurs at the 
longitude of perigee, not apogee. The reason for this 
perplexing phenomenon results from the fact that, at these 
positions, the satellite is visible around both apogees in the 
day. In the mid-latitudes, the greatest coverage is found at 
the longitudes of apogee, making most of the northern oceans 
visible at least ten hours per day. Table V-4 represents the 
twelve hour Molniya orbital elements [Ref 7 1 .  
TABLE V-4 
12-HOUR MOLNIYA ORBITAL ELEMENTS 
semimajor axis 14352 "I 
eccentricity 0.7335 
inclination ' 63.435 degrees 
argument of perigee 270.0 degrees 
E. GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) 
Although Figure V-8 appears to be a single sinusoidal 
orbit, it is in fact two complete orbits. GPS uses a half- 
synchronous orbit which repeats daily. The circular nature 
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(Figure V-9) of the orbit produces no 'loitering at any point 
in the orbit, satellite velocity remains constant over the 
period [Ref 7 1 .  
Figure V-9 
GPS Circular Orbit 
Using the 20' elevation constraint for Figure V-10 it 
appears that the GPS orbit is potentially useless for 
achieving global coverage. A single satellite covers only a 
small area at the equator, but the concept of GPS has been to 
fly as a constellation which achieves nearly global coverage 
[Ref 7 1 .  Table V-5 provides the GPS orbital elements. 
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Figure V-10 
GPS Coverage Visibility 
TABLE V-5 
GPS O R B I T A L  ELEMENTS 
semima j o r  axis 14352 NM 
eccentricity 0.0 
inclination 55 .0  degrees 
argument of perigee N/A 
F. LOW EARTH O R B I T S  
A graphic depiction of a low earth orbit will not be 
provided due partly to a lack of information and partly 
because an orbital ground trace may not be enlightening. The 
following sums up the main points of the low earth orbit: 
- Variety of orbits 
- Altitudes between 90 and 1000 NM 
- Various inclinations and eccentricities 
coverage 
- Large number of satellites required for large area 
- Possibly useful f o r  small area coverage [Ref 71. 
Notice that with so many inclinations and eccentricities 
available groundtracks for a single case would misrepresent 
rather than support meaningful data. Suffice it to say, low 
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earth orbit is not the orbit of choice for the MILSTAR or UFO 
constellation. 
G. DOPPLER/ANGULAR VELOCITY AND ACCELERATION 
Doppler and angular velocity and acceleration are 
important because they indicate whether communication 
connectivity is possible with the satellite at a given point. 
Doppler velocity was computed by taking the dot product of the 
vector difference in velocity between the satellite and the 
ground station, with the vector connecting the two points. It 
thus represents the velocity component along the line of 
sight. The greatest magnitude of Doppler velocity occurs,in 
general, at a ground station along the groundtrack, at the 
limb of visibility when the satellite is at perigee and thus, 
is moving fastest. The Doppler acceleration is computed 
numerically [ R e f  7 1 .  The data in Table V - 6  are results from 
a computer program which calculates the maximum angular rate 
and acceleration of a satellite with respect to an Earth based 
observer. These results are in the direction of the maximum 
instantaneous values, and not in a fixed coordinate system 
such as polar or azimuth-elevation. For Molniya orbits, the 
angular and Doppler rates and accelerations are only evaluated 
when the satellite is more than 90' in true anomaly from 
perigee. Below this, the satellite is moving very rapidly and 
is not considered useful f o r  communications purposes [Ref 71 .  
This table characterizes all of the orbits discussed using a 
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10' and 20' terminal elevation angle to determine which orbits 
-m 
60 Dog Indination 
24 Hr Molniya 
12 Hr Molniya 
GPS 
(HaiiSync) 
0 DogrPs lndinamn 
90 Degree Indinatwrn 
LOO 
LOO 
will be useful [Ref 7 1 .  
10 1 .a 153E-U 4.91 
20 1 .a 1 S3E-04 4.90 
10 14.71 1.68EQ3 9.5 1 
20 14.84 1.65EQ3 9.5 1 
10 1925 6.41 EQ3 36.58 
20 19.011 6.41 EQ3 36.61 
10 251 4.60E-U 9.05 
20 238 4.60E-U 9.05 
10 20.61 1 . H E 4 1  537.43 
20 19.67 1 .%E41 537.43 
20 21 .w 227E-01 57a.69 
10 2216 U T E 4 1  578.69 
4. H. ORBITAL ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS 
Table V-7 provides a table format for the conclusions of 
this analysis. One important note is that the low earth orbit 
is not compatible with MILSTAR terminals. An assumption made 
TABLE V-6 












by the engineers conducting the orbital analysis was that the 
best estimate for the orbital characteristics which a-MILSTAR 
terminal can support must be equivalent to a half synchronous 
orbit. Since the LEO orbit has a high angular rate and 
acceleration, it therefore cannot work. Geosynchronous orbits 
are probably overall the best choice as they provide adequate 
coverage either from the equator or the higher latitudes. The 
GPS coverage is good but it is in a twelve hour orbit and in 
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view less than eight hours a day for the majority of terminal 
locations. Time in view must then be divided in two because 
of the orbital period leaving two four hour blocks of 
continuous availability per day before losing contact. The 
twenty-four hour Molniya does very well if one restricts 
oneself to the portion of the orbit above the equatorial 
plane. Below the plane, Doppler and angular velocity are too 
high to have communication connectivity. The twelve hour 
Molniya orbit also doesn't work well because it has a useful 
communication window of only about seven hours per day. 
TABLE V - 7  
ORBITAL ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS 
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VI. SATELLITE SYSTEM COMPARISON 
A.  BACKGROUND 
One way to look at two systems is to use an Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP). The process is a relatively new 
technique developed over the last, ten years. It is a process 
not rooted in utility theory and has therefore remained 
outside the mainstream of decision analysis research. Since 
comparing two satellite communications systems that are 
different in mission, yet similar in capability may be 
considered odd, it was felt that the practical nature of the 
AHP would be satisfactory for solving or at least considering 
the elusive nature of this comparison problem [Ref 141. 
The process itself involves four steps: 
Step 1 - Setting up the decision hierarchy by breaking 
down the decision problem into a hierarchy of 
interrelated decision elements, 
Step 2 - Collecting input data by pairwise comparisons 
of decision elements, 
Step 3 - Using the lteigenvaluett method to estimate the 
relative weights of decision elements, 
Step 4 - Aggregating the relative weights of decision 
elements to arrive at a set of ratings for the 
decision alternatives (or outcomes) [Ref 141. 
Setting up the process is perhaps the hardest part of the 
decision apparatus, however, Figure VI-1 presents a standard 
form for the decision scheme. 
In setting up the decision hierarchy, the number of levels 
depends on the complexity of the problem. The whole system is 
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Level I 
D e m o n  D e c i m n  








31 I ri h u i t  
................... 
alitmat ive alternu ive al t c rnat ive 
>Inre detaiicd More  deiaiied 
. decision decision 
aiinhure atrribure ' .  
Figure VI-1 
The Standard Form of Decision Schema in the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process 
dependant on pairwise comparisons within each level and to 
overload a level would probably be detrimental to a good 
solution. A self-imposed limitation of nine elements is the 
standard rule of thumb when setting up the model [Ref 141. 
At Step 2 the pairwise comparisons are conducted by 
setting up a simple matrix. For example, in the Indianapolis 
500, technical capacity may be twice as important as 
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behavioral capacity in winning the race. The input matrix 
would look like this: 





Value 2 in Row 1 indicates that technical capacity is twice as 
important as behavioral capacity in achieving the higher 
objective of the next level -- winning at Indy. 
Step 3 uses the pairwise comparisons of Step 3 that 
assigns relative weights to each level. It is in Step 3 that 
the "eigenvalue" method is used to develop a scheme for the 
relative weighting. Other methods are available but none is 
as widely applied or well known [Ref 141. 
Step 4 uses the previously determined relative weights to 
produce a vector of composite weights which serve as rating of 
decision alternatives (or selection choices) in achieving the 
most general objective of the problem [Ref 141. It is the 
objective of the author to apply this theory to the satellite 
systems reviewed, couple them with potential scenarios, and 
determine which system is better suited for military 
communications in the future. 
B. SCENARIO DRIVEN COMPARISONS 
A s  United States.military commitments continue to have a 
global trend, potential areas of hostility and rapid response 
will be considered. Three areas of concern: The Persian 
Gulf, the North Pole or Polar Ice Cap, and the Mediterranean/ 
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European Theater are chosen arbitrarily as potential hot spots 
for future conflict. 
In each scenario only communications in the global sense 
will be considered. Logistics, on-station time, actual units 
deployed, etcetera will not be considered. Table VI-1 
represents the hierarchy to be considered in comparing the 
satellite systems, including the weighting assigned by the 
author. Additionally, a report card or key is provided to I 
rate the scores in each scenario. Similarly, three areas 
considered important by the author are highlighted in the 
Table and assigned weights accordingly. 
1. Persian Gulf (Hypothetical Scenario 1) 
Problem: A need for fast, reliable, global 
communications exists in order to interconnect National 
Command Authorities (NCA) with the Battlefield Commander to 
maintain initiative, surprise, and the offensive. The 
environment is extremely harsh on ground equipment and the 
threat is primarily conventional with little or no electronic 
countermeasures (ECM) or jamming. 
Solution: The use of communication satellites in 
this area of the world is critical to the success of the 
operation. Table VI-2 rates MILSTAR against UFO in this 
scenario with the results tabulated. 
Both systems function well, except that in MILSTAR'S 
case the NCA is the one receiving superb communication using 
MILSTAR while the battlefield would rely on DSCS, U F O ,  or 
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FLTSAT. MILSTAR would be able to cross-link which would be 
advantageous in peak periods but the advantage still goes to 
UFO because MILSTAR'S mission is too narrowly defined. * 
TABLE VI-1 
HIERARCHY CONSIDERATIONS AND WEIGHTING 
CHARACTERISTICS 









10 year mission life 
autonomous operation for 
minimum 30 days 
satellite hardware 
ground station compatible 
WEIGHTING 
100 
5 0  
5 0  
2 5  
2 5  
75 
50 
5 0  
2 5  
100 
Note: The two systems received ratings 
ranging from unacceptable to excellent in 
various categories. Scores are derived by 
multiplying the weighting of each criterion 
by its rating where: 
Excellent = 1.0 - Outstanding in all areas. 
Very Good = 0.75 - Meets all essential 
criteria and offers significant 
advantages. 
Good = 0.625 - Meets essential criteria and 
includes some special features. 
Satisfactory = 0.5 - Meets essential 
criteria. 
Poor = 0.25 - Falls short in essential 
areas. 
Unacceptable or N/A = 0.0 - Fails to meet 
minimum standards or lacks this 
feature. 
Scores are summed, divided by 100, .and 
rounded down to one decimal place to yield 
the final score out of a maximum possible 




PERSIAN GULF SCENARIO 
CHARACTERISTICS WE I GHTING 







anti-] am/low probability 
10 year mission life 
autonomous operation for 
minimum 30 days 
satellite hardware 




5 0  
5 0  
25  
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2. The North Pole (Hypothetical Scenario 2). 
Problem: The Soviet threat under the polar ice cap 
has escalated into more than can be tolerated by the United 
States. The United States Submarine forces are tasked with 
going under the ice in hunter-killer groups to flush out the 
Soviet menace. Communications must function in an ECM 
intensive environment and the high probability that the 
Soviets will use anti-satellite ( A S A T )  weapons. 
Solution: The burden of communications rapidly falls 
to MILSTAR in this scenario as it is designed to be up and 
communicating long after FLTSAT, LEASAT, DSCS, and even UFO 
have been neutralized. Its anti-jamming, nuclear survivable, 
ASAT defeating plethora of capability truly makes it a 
tremendous space asset for this scenario. Table VI-3 displays 
. the results for the hierarchial breakdown. 
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TABLE VI-3 
NORTH POLE SCENARIO 
CHARACTERISTICS WEIGHTING 
cost per satellite 2 5  
frequency band 50 
primary 
additional 
channel capacity 75 
cross-link 75 
nuclear survivable 100 
anti-jarn/low probability 100 
of intercept 
minimum 30 days 
10 year mission life 50 
autonomous operation for 50 
satellite hardware 25 




























3. Mediterranean/European Theater (Hypothetical Scenario 
3 )  
Problem: Tensions in the Eastern block have risen 
dramatically. Economic pressures on the Soviet Union to allow 
independence to some of its states has resulted in a power 
vacuum in Eastern Europe. Global terrorism continues to 
plague the United States and a military presence to add 
stability is required. With internal pressure in the Soviet 
Union, ECM is possible, anti-satellite weapons are considered 
to be a low probability. 
Solution: Both MILSTAR and UFO are going to perform 
well in this scenario. MILSTAR will provide outstanding 
support to NCA while UFO will be able to provide the theater 
as well as National Commander outstanding coverage. Table VI- 
4 displays the results of this scenario with the author still 
choosing UFO as the most desirable satellite. 




cost per satellite 100 
frequency band 75 
channel capacity 75 




nuclear survivable 25 
of intercept 
minimum 30 days 
10 year mission life 50 
autonomous operation for 50 
satellite hardware 25 
ground station compatible 100 
Score 





























candidates to display the differences between global threats. 
The weighting system used can be adjusted by the individual 
based on experience, threat analysis, or criteria supplied yet 
not weighed here. The next chapter concludes the analysis of 
the comparison of the two satellite communication systems. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS/FOLLOW-ON STUDY 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Initially, the author sought to compare two satellite 
communication systems. Both are communications satellites and 
both represent the future. It is the author's conclusion that 
the technological advances gained from the- MILSTAR program 
should not be lost. It is also this author's conclusion that 
MILSTAR should not be orbited. It costs too much and it will 
be used primarily by the National Command Authorities in times 
of crises. 
opinion that very little is gained for the money spent. 
With usage only at that level, it is this author's 
If money were .an unlimited resource the question of 
funding MILSTAR would be moot. Of course we would fund the 
program. It is state of the art. It does for EHF in the 90's 
what research did for UHF in the 5 0 ' s ;  it makes it viable. 
Money, however, is a big concern in any acquisition in the 
9 0 ' s .  With an unclear global threat, countries in a power- 
vacuum, and Congress looking to cut rather than increase the 
defense budget, the Air Force does none of the services a 
favor by driving ahead with this program. 
It is the opinion of this author that, should the services 
desire to maintain funding to keep ourselves at the cutting 
edge of technology, we will have to learn to field systems 
which can be developed at reasonable cost; with the foresight 
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a program that more appropriately evolves as new technology is 
developed, such as the DSCS program. More research must be 
conducted in developing cheaper ways to deliver hardware to 
space. The cost per pound to put U.S. satellites in space is 
too high today and prices are not likely to recede. 
Finally, a complete look at the acquisition process needs 
to be conducted to develop a set of guidelines for cutting off 
that allows for significant future upgrades: and the rational 
minds to recognize when to stop funding things that become 
money sponges. 
B. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
This author did not develop any software supported models 
to compare the two satellite systems. A potential area for 
further research would be to develop the hierarchial model 
using a software such as Expert Choice with DoD developed 
scenarios. Additionally, a classified thesis would be able to 
more deeply explore the generation of the unique MILSTAR 
waveform versus the waveform used by UFO. 
The research conducted on MILSTAR could be applied to more 
integrated satellite programs such as the theater/user 
dedicated communications satellite system concept [Ref 151 or 
new requirements and building systems that have room to grow. 
It is this author's opinion that new technology is tremendous 
and provides the edge in battle, however, if adding 
requirements keeps the technology from the field 10 to 12 
years, the military will always be saying next year we will 
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have the edge. Next y e a r  may not come so it is time to get 
smart and field the systems that can evolve with the 
technology. 
.. 
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